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This report was commissioned from CJP Consultants 
Limited by the Department of Health. It sets out the 
issues relating to hazardous and harmful consumption of 
alcohol in Ireland. It looks at the international 
experience and policy response; and makes 
recommendations about how the problems caused by 
hazardous alcohol consumption can and should be 
tackled in Ireland. 
MAIN POINTS 
 
 There is some evidence that there are modest health benefits from low 
alcohol consumption. However, there is compelling evidence, built up 
over many decades of research, that alcohol mostly causes harm. The 
quantity of harm is proportional to the amount of alcohol consumed. 
 The societal costs of existing levels of alcohol consumption in Ireland 
far outweigh the employment, trade and tax benefits. 
 There is strong international evidence to suggest that reduced 
consumption of alcohol reduces societal harms. 
 The most powerful weapon to reduce consumption is to increase price. 
 Excise taxes per unit of alcohol, is an effective way to get alcohol 
prices up. The fiscal consequences of such measures are usually 
positive. 
 But even this measure is not without problems, not least of which is 
that it enables retailers to ‘give away’ alcohol, should they so choose. 
 Minimum prices and/or below cost selling bans are also policy options. 
Inflation indexation of duties is often called for, as are tax rises to 
prevent alcohol affordability rising with incomes. 
 Minimum price legislation might violate EU competition law, but the 
Scottish Court has convincingly argued that it does not. This has been 
appealed by the alcohol industry. We believe that a policy of MUP in 
Ireland would not violate EU Competition Law and would prove very 
beneficial as a public health measure.  
 This is one reason, apparently, why the UK (in England and Wales) 
has opted for a below cost selling ban. However, the UK Government 
has not rejected outright the use of MUP; it remains a policy under 
consideration but it will not be taken forward at present.  
 Cross border selling and smuggling is a real issue. Data on the impact 
are scarce. 
 Fraud is also an issue: again data are (naturally) scarce.  
 Employment consequences of price and tax reform are likely to be 
small.  
 The growing gap between on and off-licence alcohol prices is stark. It 
explains at least part of why drinking patterns are shifting so radically. If 
there is a health and/or social  benefit from encouraging people to drink 
in licenced premises rather than at home, then measures need to be 
adopted that will close this gap. 
 The increased purchasing of alcohol in the off-trade is having a 
detrimental impact on the pub trade. The pub is a safer and more 
controlled environment for alcohol consumption. Any policy that would 
tilt the balance back towards the on-trade would be desirable from both 
a social and health perspective. 
 The beneficial effects of pricing and taxation policies are likely to be 
maximised only as part of a much broader alcohol strategy.  
 Saskatchewan’s decision to set minimum prices for alcohol content has 
been very successful in reducing harmful consumption of alcohol. It 
was politically unpopular when it was first taken ten years ago. After 
the extensions and price rises on 1 April 2010, total annual per capita 
consumption fell by 3.5% at the same time as the value of the alcohol 
sold increased by 4.3% per capita; the public was drinking less, but 
spending more. It was calculated that a 10% increase in minimum price 
across all beverages was associated with an 8.4% reduction in total 
consumption. 
 The Centre of Addiction Research of British Columbia (BC) looked at 
the implementation in BC of minimum alcohol prices. They found that a 
10% increase in minimum price reduces consumption of spirits by 
6.8%, wine by 8.9%, coolers and cider by 13.9%, beer by 1.5% and all 
alcoholic drinks combined by 3.4%. This research in British Columbia 
represents the first empirical verification that minimum price policies 
reduce alcohol consumption at the population level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
After a thorough examination of the theoretical literature and its associated 
evidence base the reader is left with a singular impression: harmful alcohol 
consumption has to fall.  
 
The debate then starts over how best to achieve this: a broad strategy that 
encompasses pricing, education, availability, advertising and other factors is 
always recommended. But pricing gives the biggest bang for the buck: if we 
can do one thing only out of all the policy choices, then get the price of alcohol 
up. 
 
How best to achieve this? Again, there is near unanimity on this: put excise 
taxes up. This first-best choice immediately runs into the practical problem of 
below cost selling: retailers can virtually give alcohol away, so the effects of 
higher taxation can, to an extent, be mitigated by the behaviour of some 
retailers. Furthermore, increasing excise duty across the board would not be 
as effective in targeting harmful and hazardous drinkers. It would penalize the 
on-trade and the off-trade indiscriminately, whereas it seems that the problem 
with cheap alcohol arises in the off-trade. It may not be necessary to make 
higher price alcohol more expensive than it is. It is not an aim to make it cost 
prohibitive for all drinkers. More generally, in Ireland and the UK, pricing at the 
retail level over the past decade has led to a stark and growing gap between 
the price of alcohol purchased either on or off-licence. It has become very 
cheap to drink at home relative to the pub or restaurant. The lack of an 
external social setting may have contributed to problem drinking. The pub is 
also a more controlled and safer environment. 
 
The policy instruments available are volumetric pricing (minimum prices per 
unit of alcohol), bans on below cost selling, setting a floor price equal to 
excise duties plus VAT (a particular type of below cost ban) and other 
fiscal/excise measures. The experience of other countries points to a number 
of strong conclusions: 
 
1. Do something. The health costs of alcohol consumption are large and 
growing, almost to the point where it is as big a problem as tobacco.  
 
2. Do more than one thing: there is a menu of policy choices. There are 
benefits and risks associated with each choice. Sometimes it seems 
there is a tendency in policy making circles to imagine that only one 
lever at a time should be pulled.  
 
3. Minimum unit pricing should be a key part of reform. The risk here is 
that government revenues fall with reduced alcohol consumption. We 
think this effect is likely to be small. But this risk can be mitigated by a 
dual policy: minimum unit pricing and higher excise taxes. This can be 
done, if desired, to achieve tax revenue neutrality. Or it can be part of a 
revenue raising package. 
 
4. A simple ban on below cost selling has clearly been attractive to the 
UK government. It is a blunt instrument that, with alcohol, seems to be 
a unique experiment. It is a free gift to retailers’ profit margins. A 
special tax levied on the industry to capture potential ‘supernormal 
profits’ is a possibility, but this would be a cumbersome policy that 
would likely be very difficult to administer and would not find favour with 
tax collection agencies. The likely effects on consumption and health 
are somewhat unknown. If it is to be tried it would seem better to 
combine it with other measures, such as the ones we recommend, 
above. 
 
5. Other countries have been slow to reform. This is just politics; it is 
linked to the power, in some cases, of the alcohol industry. Sometimes 
it seems to be simple inertia in the face of uncertainty: the long run 
effects of radical tax reform are never fully foreseeable. 
 
6. Other measures could include the inflation indexing of excise duties, 
minimum drinks prices, policies particularly targeted at problem 
drinkers and bans on promotions such as 2-for-1 and happy hours. All 
of these have benefits but should be thought of as secondary to the 
main options, above and, if they are to be tried, should only be part of a 
wider package. 
 
7. As a public health policy, any measures that would succeed in reducing 
the harmful consumption of alcohol should be considered very 
carefully. In the short term there is an obvious risk that reduced alcohol 
consumption would undermine employment in the alcohol industry and 
undermine tax revenues. We do not believe that either of these effects 
would be significant and in the longer-term would be totally surpassed 
by the positive economic, financial and social effects of a reduction in 
harmful and hazardous consumption of alcohol.  
 
8. A Minimum Unit Price looks like the best policy option, but would need 
to be accompanied by other measures to make it most effective in 
switching consumption from high alcohol content drinks to lower 
content alcoholic drinks, and in reducing harmful and hazardous 
consumption by drinkers who are most at risk. 
 
9. A Minimum Pricing Order would inevitably be challenged in the courts, 
as was the case in Scotland. Indeed, that judgment is subject to 
appeal. The Court of Session in Scotland rejected the appeals on the 
basis that none of the challenges to the MUP measure were well 
founded. In its judgment it stated that alternative measures such as 
excise duty increases, would be less effective in achieving the 
legitimate aims which the minimum pricing measures pursue. 
Furthermore it observed that there is literature and oral evidence that 
excise duty rises might not be passed on (or not passed on in full) to 
consumers. The potential problem does not arise under minimum 
pricing’. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Several themes are common across countries. To a greater (mostly) or lesser 
extent, policy is based on evidence. There is a common evidence base in the 
academic literature where many of the most recent and most thorough studies 
look at international data sources (where ‘international’ in practice mostly 
means English speaking countries). There are, of course, many country 
specific studies. Data depth, breadth and quality do vary across countries. 
The academic literature is extensive and goes back many years. Statistical 
and methodological issues common to research of this kind are problematic 
but the accumulated evidence is such that reasonably robust conclusions can 
nevertheless be drawn. 
‘There is indisputable evidence that the price of alcohol matters. If the price of 
alcohol goes up, alcohol-related harm goes down. Younger drinkers are 
affected by price and heavy drinkers are more affected than light drinkers.’ 
(WHO, 2009)1. 
These conclusions of the World Health Organisation are based on research 
conducted over many years: there is accumulated evidence that 
unambiguously supports these (and other) findings. As we will see, 
researchers around the world consistently arrive at qualitatively similar results. 
Anyone used to the robust debates often sparked by statistical and 
econometric enquiries in other disciplines (such as economics) cannot fail to 
be struck by the consistency of the findings of alcohol researchers. 
Policy initiatives differ across countries but there are common threads. 
Governments typically partner with various stakeholders to review the 
evidence, explore options, commission research and undertake often 
extensive (and sometimes prolonged) consultation exercises. Polices towards 
alcohol have, as a result, sometimes changed. In many cases, the changes 
have not been as far reaching, or indeed occurred as quickly, as many 
national reports and studies have advocated; health lobbies have often been 
disappointed. The Alcohol industry appears to lobby well. Nevertheless, the 
trend towards policies that incentivise ‘responsible’ drinking is clear. This is a 
process rather than a discrete event, not unlike the one that has been under 
way for the fast five decades since the health consequences of smoking first 
received attention.  
The definition of responsible drinking varies across countries and is not the 
focus of this report. We are interested in policies, evidence and experience of 
pricing and taxation measures that produce the desired outcome of less 
drinking amongst high risk groups. At a societal level that almost certainly 
means less drinking, as well as a compositional shift towards low-strength 
products. 
We are also interested in the economic consequences of alcohol tax reform. 
There, the literature is far less extensive, as we shall note at several points in 
this report. Researchers in this area are typically convinced by the 
accumulated evidence and are therefore focused on the best or most efficient 
ways to get alcohol prices up; the best ways to target problem drinkers; the 
best ways to get alcohol harm down. It is also true that disentangling the short 
and long run economic effects of alcohol reform is not easy. In the first 
instance, there isn’t that much actual reform to study; the data just are not 
there. Second, the most likely long run economic and employment 
consequences are believed by some researchers to be marginal. 
Employment, for example, is likely to be unchanged in aggregate, although 
there may well be some compositional shifts between the alcohol industry and 
elsewhere. Arguably, exports are a priority in the Irish case and these should 
not be affected by domestic tax and price reform, so the associated output 
and employment consequences could be negligible, even in the short run. We 
review the economic evidence, where it exists. 
The evidence base around Cross Border Shopping is also scarce. Where 
there are estimates available, it does suggest that there is an issue, but one 
that can only ultimately be served by tax harmonisation, something that looks 
a long way off in Europe. Not surprisingly; estimates of the amount of fraud 
(illegal imports and unlicenced domestic production) is also thin on the 
ground. As taxes rise, the incentive for all these activities also rises, although 
precise quantification is extremely problematic. A rare estimate by the WHO 
has suggested that Fraud costs the EU around 8% of alcohol excise duties. 
The economic consequences will depend on the type of reform adopted and 
its quantum. We suspect that one of the reasons why there is relatively little 
focus in the literature on the output, jobs, cross border, fraud and fiscal 
consequences is that they are thought either to be minimal (or even positive, 
in the case of tax revenues when excise duties are raised) or will be swamped 
by the elimination of just some of the social costs of alcohol. 
Saskatchewan’s decision to set minimum prices for alcohol content has been 
very successful in reducing harmful consumption of alcohol. It was politically 
unpopular when it was first taken ten years ago. It was calculated that a 10% 
increase in minimum price across all beverages was associated with an 8.4% 
reduction in total consumption. The Centre of Addiction Research of British 
Columbia (BC) looked at the implementation in BC of minimum alcohol prices. 
They found that a 10% increase in minimum price reduces consumption of 
spirits by 6.8%, wine by 8.9%, coolers and cider by 13.9%, beer by 1.5% and 
all alcoholic drinks combined by 3.4%.  
ECONOMICS OF ALCOHOL 
 
Research often begins with attempts to estimate price and income elasticities. 
For example, a rule of thumb based on many different studies is that when 
alcohol prices rise by 10%, demand falls by 5% (a price elasticity of -0.5). 
Gallet2 (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 132 studies and found a median 
price elasticity for all beverage types of -0.52 in the short term and -0.82 in the 
long term. Some further discussion of elasticities is to be found later in this 
report. 
Relatively little formal work exists that addresses the purely economic 
consequences of alcohol tax reform. Simple narratives do suggest that 
employment in the alcohol industry, for example, falls when taxes rise.  But 
the World Health Organisation, and some other researchers (Baumberg, 
2006)3 argue that this is too simplistic. “In the long run, the evidence suggests 
that the effect of alcohol policy on employment would be zero” (WHO, 2009) 
(Essentially because less money spent on alcohol will still be spent 
elsewhere.) Equally, there is little formal work on the long run fiscal 
consequences of tax reform, one exception being IFS4, 2012, who suggest 
they are likely to be small. Beyond simple ‘ready-reckoner’ estimates there is 
a dearth of evidence when it comes to Government finances. Again, we 
suspect that this is because most researchers assume that higher taxes will 
lead to a positive outcome for the Government and the societal savings via 
reduced healthcare, crime and other costs are so well identified, if indirect. 
In terms of pure theory, a small number of economic studies have tried to 
complement the orthodox approach (as discussed below) with a research 
strategy that appeals to ‘consumer sovereignty’. For example, Cnossen5, 
2006, sees ‘a rational, fully informed consumer should be allowed to drink 
whatever and as much as he likes as long as he does not bother other 
people’. Such a perspective can be traced back through various economists 
to the writings of John Stuart Mill when, in 1869, he wrote his famous essay 
on paternalism ‘On Liberty’. The upshot of this line of thinking is that alcohol 
excise taxes should compensate for the ‘externality’ of societal harm. 
Although work in this area is noticeable by its absence, it would seem 
uncontroversial to suggest that for most, if not all, countries alcohol taxation 
does not meet this definition of optimality. At this stage of the discussion we 
could delve further into the economics of optimal taxation but this would be 
beyond the remit of this study.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
CANADA 
Policy Practice and Evidence in Canada 
The Canadian literature – and associated policy response – is extensive. 
Considerable resources have been devoted to the issues at both the Federal 
and Provincial/Territorial level. Great care has been taken to understand the 
nature of the problem and to propose robust, evidence-based policy 
responses. Nevertheless, as in other jurisdictions, the strength and 
weaknesses of the evidence base are both obvious and widely 
acknowledged. The research effort is far from complete and is an on-going 
project. Data limitations and unresolved issues around scientific methodology 
are always going to be part of a debate of this nature.  
Canadian Background 
In August 1988, legislation was passed in Parliament, with support from all 
parties, which led to the creation of the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse 
(CCSA). This was the ‘national focus’ of Canada’s Drug Strategy which itself 
was launched in 1987. Canada’s approach to alcohol was nested, in large 
part, within this drug strategy.  
Canada views the issues associated with alcohol abuse as part of a wider 
problem and, therefore, involves a broad strategic response. For the purposes 
of this report we are concerned solely with policy, practice and evidence with 
regard to alcohol. In practice, the CCSA has to a considerable extent itself 
prioritised alcohol abuse. Indeed, it’s ‘mission statement’ reads ‘CCSA has a 
legislated mandate to provide national leadership and evidence-informed 
analysis and advice to mobilise collaborative efforts to reduce alcohol - and 
other drug related -harm’. There are no doubt many drivers of the focus on 
alcohol; not least must be the finding, common across most jurisdictions 
where evidence is available, that the societal costs of alcohol abuse far 
exceed the costs of the use of illegal drugs and is only slightly less than the 
costs of tobacco consumption. The most recent data for Canada suggest that 
tobacco comprises 42.7% of societal costs, alcohol 36.6% and illegal drugs 
20.7%. (Those total costs were estimated at C$ 14.6bn, C$ 463 per capita, at 
2002 prices) We suspect that this quite fundamental research finding is 
somewhat underappreciated in some other jurisdictions.  
In 2005, Canada embarked on a series of cross-country consultations as part 
of the National Framework for Action to Reduce the Harms Associated with 
Alcohol and Drugs and other Substances6. Much prior data gathering, 
research and consultation (prompted in part by the prior launch in 2003 of a 
new Federal drug strategy) led up to the creation of this National Framework, 
which itself had many different strands, the most relevant of which, for the 
purposes of this report, is the National Alcohol Strategy (NAS). ‘Partners and 
Stakeholders’ in this initiative include the CCSA, the Brewers Association of 
Canada, Health Canada (their equivalent of the Irish Department of Health) 
and MADD Canada (a lobby group with a focus on drink driving). 
The NAS culminated in a major report published in 2007 ‘Reducing Alcohol-
Related Harm in Canada: Toward a Culture of Moderation, 7. Nested within 
this report is a set of recommendations that refer to the availability of alcohol 
(which is where pricing and taxation policies are discussed). It should be 
stressed that the report embraces health promotion, prevention and 
education, health impacts and treatment and safer communities, as well as 
alcohol availability: this is important because the effectiveness of pricing and 
taxation initiatives are almost certainly best maximised as part of a broader 
strategy. 
The report contained 41 recommendations, 16 of which relate to availability, 3 
of which refer to pricing and taxation. (It is worth noting that many of the 
recommendations are essentially calls for further research to explore 
identified knowledge gaps). The recommendations on pricing were as follows: 
1. Adopt minimum retail social-reference prices for alcohol and index these 
prices, at least annually, to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). A competent 
body should review alcohol pricing throughout Canada, at least annually, 
and publish a report recommending increases where prices are not keeping 
pace with inflation. 
2. Create incentives, whether through tax or price adjustments, to promote the 
production and marketing of lower alcohol content beers and coolers, with 
the overall goal of reducing the volume of absolute alcohol consumed per 
capita in Canada. 
3. Move towards alcohol volumetric pricing (based on the volume of ethyl 
alcohol in alcohol products) within each beverage class. 
Subsequently, a new advisory committee (the National Alcohol Strategy 
Advisory Committee, NASAC) was established in 2008 with the aim of 
implementing, monitoring and evaluating the 41 recommendations of the 2007 
NAS report. The ‘availability’ subset of recommendations saw a focus on 
pricing and taxation, culminating in three new reports published late last year 
under the heading Alcohol Price Policy in Canada.8 
The self-described aim of these latest reports is ‘to provide context and 
evidence to support the price policy recommendations contained in the 
National Alcohol Strategy’. Clearly not all of the recommendations of the 2007 
report have been fully implemented. But context is needed here: there has 
been at least partial implementation across Canada (see below). 
The 2012 pricing study reiterates and refines the earlier recommendations. It 
now describes them as ‘principles’: 
1. Inflation indexing. 
2. Base prices (including minimum prices) on alcohol content to incentivise a 
switch from high to low strength products. 
3. Minimum prices to remove inexpensive products.  
 
The Canadian Evidence Base 
The evidence base cited in the Canadian literature is also, in part at least, 
often cited in other jurisdictions. It can be summarised as follows. 
1. Simple economics: other things being equal, alcohol consumption is 
inversely related to price. Decades of research support this conclusion: 
one of the most commonly cited studies, itself a ‘meta study’ is that of 
Wagenaar, Salois & Komro, 2009,9 which looked at 112 previous 
studies of alcohol tax or price effects, containing 1003 estimates of the 
tax/price-consumption relationship. A Meta study of this type is 
motivated in part by the need to mitigate the statistical and other 
methodological problems that can often affect the results of any one 
individual study. If similar results are obtained using different data sets 
and/or different methodologies there is, provided certain conditions are 
met, reason to believe that those results are reasonably robust.  
2. Different studies produce different results for the sensitivity - the 
elasticity - of alcohol demand to its price. The results can be very 
different, at least in terms of size of the effect, but the bulk of the 
evidence is consistent on the sign: if price goes up, demand falls. The 
results - the size - vary across countries, time periods and type of 
alcohol being studied, but the direction of the effect is, for the most 
part, always negative. Data are supportive of both intuition and 
economic theory. 
3. The conclusions of Wagenaar et al are worth quoting: “A large 
literature establishes that beverage alcohol prices and taxes are 
related inversely to drinking. Effects are large compared to other 
prevention policies and programs. Public policies that raise prices of 
alcohol are an effective means to reduce drinking”. 
4. The data are also consistent with the proposition that those who spend 
the most on alcohol are affected - and respond - the most by/to price 
changes. Regular drinkers are a principal target of price policy 
interventions. 
5. When light drinkers observe that they are being unfairly penalised 
because of the actions of problem drinkers, it is possible to argue that 
they benefit, indirectly, from the reduced societal costs of problem 
drinking. The evidence base for this proposition is not extensive, but 
does seem logical: if the societal costs are large, as they seem to be, 
everyone benefits when they are reduced.  
6. Recent research10,11,12,13 suggests that ‘efficiency’ of policy means that 
risky drinkers can be successfully targeted using appropriate price 
policies. There is international evidence that suggests risky drinkers 
are price sensitive and tend to buy lower priced products. But the 
Canadian data suggest that only roughly half of the societal costs of 
alcohol will be so targeted. Policy also has to target those moderate 
drinkers who ‘occasionally’ drink in risky ways. The Canadian response 
to this is embodied in the recommendation of complementary policies 
of indexation and minimum prices. The latter targets problem drinkers, 
the former targets the whole population of drinkers. Indexation has 
been adopted, in 2010, by the provincial government of Ontario. 
7. Another Canadian body, the Centre of Addiction Research of British 
Columbia (BC) looked at the implementation in BC of minimum alcohol 
prices. They found that a 10% increase in minimum price reduces 
consumption of spirits by 6.8%, wine by 8.9%, coolers and cider by 
13.9%, beer by 1.5% and all alcoholic drinks combined by 3.4%. “this 
research represents the first empirical verification that minimum price 
policies reduce alcohol consumption at the population level”8. 
8. The Province of Saskatchewan is interesting in a number of regards, in 
terms of both the actions it has taken and the time it took to implement 
them. As the World Health Organisation has stressed14, 
Saskatchewan’s decision to set minimum prices for alcohol content 
was politically unpopular when it was first taken ten years ago. “After 
the extensions and price rises on 1 April 2010, total annual per capita 
consumption fell by 3.5% at the same time as the value of the alcohol 
sold increased by 4.3% per capita; the public was drinking less, but 
spending more. It was calculated that a 10% increase in minimum price 
across all beverages was associated with an 8.4% reduction in total 
consumption.” 
9. In terms of the evidence of actual alcohol related harm, research8 cited 
by the Canadians includes studies from various countries that suggest 
alcohol price increases can reduce disease, road accidents, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and suicides, domestic and other violence and 
work-place accidents. 
10. Data on who (by sex and age) drinks what are extensive. But less so in 
Canada. The Canadians draw on data from the US and UK to illustrate 
the possible/probable harm being done by different patterns of alcohol 
consumption. The data are suggestive, for example, of the need to 
reduce the availability of cheap alcohol to young males. This is one of 
many areas that see calls for further research.  
11.  There is Canadian evidence that suggests most drinkers cannot 
actually tell the difference between low and high strength beers. The 
Canadians refer to the success of Australian initiatives in the 1980s to 
incentivise the production and consumption of low to mid-strength beer. 
While sales volumes are unchanged, per capita alcohol consumption 
can fall. Such policies, it is asserted (not quite proved) produce ‘win-
win….options that simultaneously meets the goals of public finance, 
public health and public safety’8. 
 
Summary of the Canadian Experience 
As with many other countries, Canada’s attempts to limit alcohol consumption 
can be traced back to the 19th century, if not before. Those early attempts 
were largely the efforts of various Temperance movements. There are 
certainly links between those early efforts and more modern attempts to 
encourage either abstinence or responsible drinking. Those recent efforts 
really began a quarter of a century ago, have involved a broad collaboration 
between government (at both Federal and Provincial levels), NGOs, health 
lobbies, academics and the drinks industry itself. Most of the initiatives related 
to pricing of alcohol have come at the provincial level. The coordinated 
response that began in the 1980s has elicited change but not as much as 
most of the various stakeholders have asked for; this is still an on-going 
project. The reasons for the less than instantaneous implementation of the 
various (and repeated) recommendations can only be a matter of conjecture. 
Radical change always takes time, vested interests do obviously exist and the 
fiscal consequences of lower alcohol consumption are often hard to predict in 
advance. It is worth noting that the Canadian experience has been drawn 
upon in many other countries. 
The current state of play with regard to pricing is described in the following 
table, itself derived from materials presented in the recent reports outlined 
above. 
Table 1: Pricing Policies in Canada 
Province Minimum Prices? Adjusted for 
Alcohol content? 
Indexed? 
BC In govt. stores only 
(~55%) 
No No 
Alberta On-sales only Yes No 
Sask. Yes Yes Yes 
Ontario Yes Partial Yes 
Quebec Beer only No Yes 
New B. Partial No No 
 
So, from the perspective of the authors of the NAS and its stakeholders, there 
is demonstrable progress but with some way still left to travel. As we have 
stated, this is a process. 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
Background 
Many researchers acknowledge the significant role that alcohol plays in 
Australia. For example, a recent major survey15,16 of pricing and taxation 
options begins with words “Alcohol has played an integral role in the social 
and cultural fabric of Australian society since the early days of colonialisation”. 
Analysts have estimated the social cost of alcohol abuse to amount to A$ 15.3 
bn in 2004-05.  Cross country comparisons of these kinds of statistics need to 
be handled with care, but this suggests higher per capita social costs in 
Australia compared to Canada. 
Official concerns have been expressed about a “binge drinking epidemic”17 
with the Australian government calling one of its drinking awareness websites 
www.drinkingnightmare.gov.au. 
The literature18-24 within Australia and across different countries often refers to 
the same baseline studies and surveys. There is an accumulated evidence 
base around two key propositions. The data strongly suggest a direct link 
between reduced alcohol consumption, and alcohol prices and taxes; reduced 
alcohol consumption leads directly to reduced associated harms 
There are many similarities between the Canadian and Australian 
experiences (as there are overlaps across many other jurisdictions). Various 
academics, research institutes, consumer groups, the alcohol industry and 
Federal and Local governments have all contributed to a large and growing 
literature. While we have not spent time on the ground in either Canada or 
Australia, our impression from our desk based research is that the debate in 
Australia has been a noisy one, if not actually more fractious than the 
Canadian discussion. As with Canada, it seems, on one level at least, that a 
reasonable consensus has emerged from a broad cross section of 
stakeholders (with the unsurprising exception of parts of the alcohol industry) 
but progress in implementing the various recommended reforms has, on the 
whole, been slower. There is, however,  a slightly nuanced, alternative view 
on this seeming consensus.  
Australia’s alcohol priorities have been laid out by the National Preventative 
Health Task Force25. The recommendations of this group, made in 2009, echo 
similar findings in other countries, not least in Canada, as discussed above. 
The focus should be on alcohol availability, taxation and pricing, drink-driving, 
treatment services, drinking contexts, regulation of advertising and education.  
 
In an interesting - and unique - study, Fogerty and Chapman24  start from the 
basic proposition that ‘...significant reform has not occurred. News media 
coverage of these priorities has not reported public health experts as in 
agreement and Government has not acted upon the legislative 
recommendations made’. This study is marked out from the usual more formal 
statistical reviews and reports: it asks experts their opinions. The insights 
gained from this exercise are fascinating and potentially very useful. We 
explore them in greater depth below. 
 A parallel set of recommendations on alcohol taxation is nested within the 
broad 2008 Henry review26 of Australia’s tax system. This report concluded 
that “all alcoholic beverages should be taxed on volumetric basis, which, over 
time, should converge to a single rate, with a low-alcohol threshold introduced 
for all products”.  Volumetric, or unit, pricing is the nearest thing we have 
found in the literature that amounts to a consensus: almost all stakeholders 
agree that it is the most effective way to reduce consumption and harm. 
Notwithstanding this consensus, volumetric pricing is not without controversy. 
For example, ‘tiering‘ attracts much analysis and disagreement. Tiering 
involves different minimum unit alcohol prices for different strength drinks with 
the aim of switching consumption away from high to low alcohol-by-volume 
drinks.  It is also claimed that tiering could target specific groups of problem 
drinkers, although the evidence for this is thin and the policy has not, to our 
knowledge, been tried anywhere. The Henry proposals on volumetric pricing 
were rejected by the Australian government, mostly because of concerns 
about the possible consequences for the domestic wine industry (tiering would 
raise the price of wine relative to most other major drinks groups). 
Two important Australian agencies have also proposed volumetric pricing, the 
National Preventative Health Taskforce27  (NPHT) and the National Alliance 
for Action on Alcohol28 (NAAA); the NAAA is an umbrella body for over 50 
leading Australian health organisations.  Both agencies also argue for tiered 
pricing. The most common reason for tiering is that there are concerns that 
simple volumetric pricing could lead to a switch in consumption patterns 
towards higher strength products. This is partly due to the complexities of the 
Australian tax system which currently levies very low taxes, relatively at least, 
on low priced wine. Volumetric taxation, it is feared, could lead to rising 
relative prices of cheap wine and low-strength beers.29  But these concerns 
should not detract from the universality of the calls for volumetric pricing and, 
not least the international and Australia-specific research that has concluded 
that the health benefits from volumetric pricing are considerable. 
What are typically called alcohols in Britain and Ireland are (formally) called  
RTDs (ready-to-drink) in Australia. These have attracted specific taxation 
measures to try and curb associated binge drinking, particularly amongst 
younger people.  
At this stage we hope we have outlined the complexity of the Australian 
alcohol tax system; it is worth noting that the Henry review called it 
“incoherent”. The President of the Public health association of Australia has 
labelled it “a dog’s breakfast”30.     
Table 2 : Australian Public Health Organisation & Industry 
Recommendations 
 
Body Volumetric  taxation Increase tax 
rate 
Trend real 
price 
increase 
Floor price 
 Tiered Not tiered    
Henry 
review 
 Yes    
NAAA Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
NPHT Yes    Yes 
DSICA*  Yes    
 
*Distilled Spirits Industry Council Australia 
 
As noted, relatively little policy action has resulted from all of these different 
studies, reports and recommendations “...the government rejected the 
volumetric tax proposal, citing a wine glut and possible industry restructuring. 
Likewise31, the government opted to only note recommendations regarding 
setting a minimum price for alcohol and restricting advertising through 
legislation, without committing to introduce the proposals”24.   
The Fogarty & Chapman24 study mentioned above is essentially a recent 
attempt to understand why things have developed in this way and tries to 
suggest a way forward for those still seeking to reform Australia’s alcohol tax 
system. This qualitative - but nevertheless quite systematic - study is, in a 
sense, an exercise in realpolitik with some important insights. Its broad 
conclusions/insights can be summarised as follows. 
 
1. Any one policy change is likely to have small effects. Proposals are best 
thought of as a package. Serious reform can only come about this way. 
“Taxation is the most cost effective, but taxation doesn’t work in isolation”. 
2. The three policy areas universally deemed to be crucial were 
a. price 
b. availability 
c. marketing (but see 4, below) 
3. Real world policy constraints have to be acknowledged: by all means 
prioritise but be ‘opportunistic’ - do what you can when you can. 
4. The positive effects of taxation reform are real and uncontroversial. Policy 
proposals in this area are firmly evidence based. This cannot be said, at 
least as strongly, when it comes to advertising reforms.  
5. Volumetric pricing is universally acknowledged to be the most effective 
reform, usually in a tiered fashion (again, tiering did not meet with universal 
agreement). 
6. The adoption of minimum prices is the next best reform, either alongside 
volumetric pricing or instead of it: this latter option is pure realpolitik, 
mentioned by those who think it politically difficult  for the government to 
introduce another ‘big tax’.  
We hope we have conveyed the sense of disappointment that the various 
stakeholders have demonstrated since the rash of reports published over the 
last few years have largely failed to alter policies. If anything, this 
disappointment has encouraged some agencies to redouble their efforts. For 
example, the Foundation for Alcohol research and Education (FARE) recently 
criticised32 the Government for ignoring the Henry Review (“..and the seven 
government reviews before it”) and commissioned Marsden Jacob Associates 
(MJA), a consultancy, to produce a major cost benefit analysis of  alcohol 
taxation reform33. The MJA report is interesting: it is very recent and its 
methodology is relatively unusual in that it attempts a comprehensive cost 
benefit analysis from a proper economic perspective. It is an explicit attempt 
to extend the preliminary analysis presented in the Henry Report; the authors 
suggest that it is the first such cost benefit analysis of Australian alcohol 
taxation and policy. The MJA study’s main conclusions are: 
 
 
1. The ‘harms to others’ (a minimal definition of the costs of alcohol abuse) 
amount to A$15 bn per annum. 
2. Abolition of the Wine Equalisation Tax (an ad valorem tax that is an 
embedded part of the system) and replace it with volumetric tax 
3. Higher tax revenues should be given back to consumers via a reduction in 
other (inefficient) taxes 
4. Two model simulations were performed 
a. WET abolished, A$29.05 new tax per litre of alcohol, all other excise 
duties unchanged: net public benefit of A$230m  
b. WET abolished, A$29.05 new tax per litre of alcohol, all excise duties 
other than wine increased by 50%: net public benefit of A$250m  
5. Minimum prices are viewed very negatively: the authors see these as a gift 
to producers and/or retailer’s profit margins. ‘The option of minimum prices 
is highly regressive.’  
6. The modelling is done under conservative assumptions; ‘realistic’ estimates 
of the benefits are probably higher 
7. The model is not country specific: the authors claim general applicability 
across the UK and elsewhere. 
While the MJA report is the most comprehensive we have seen, there have 
been other responses of a similar absence of reform. For example, the 
Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Foundation (AER) commissioned the 
Allen Consulting Group to model three alternatives to the current system34. 
Qualitatively the conclusions and results are similar to the MJA study: reform 
of the tax system based on volumetric pricing reduces harmful drinking (and in 
the case of this study, unlike the MJA report, raises tax revenues). 
Australia has produced research and evidence consistent with the experience 
of other countries. The conclusions are the same: if the price of alcohol is 
raised, consumption and harm will fall. There is debate over the best way to 
raise prices but a broad consensus is agreed over some form of volumetric 
pricing. Minimum price advocates acknowledge the implicit free gift to alcohol 
retail profits but point to the mixed evidence on pass-through of tax changes: 
volumetric pricing without minimum retail prices could, theoretically, still allow 
retailers to give alcohol away, or at least sell below cost, as part of a loss-
leading strategy. Most stakeholders also agree that pricing and taxation 
should form part of an overall strategy designed to reduce alcohol 
consumption. Nevertheless, higher alcohol prices are likely to be the most 
important component of such a strategy. 
EUROPE 
The World Health Organisation (2005) estimates that harmful drinking is 
responsible for 10.8% of the disease burden across the EU. Adding up the 
health care, lost output and criminal justice system costs led Anderson and 
Baumberg (AB, 2006) to conclude that alcohol costs the EU €125 bn a year, 
four times the total collection of alcohol excise duties.35 
The AB, 2006 study was written on behalf of the UK’s Institute of Alcohol 
Studies and was prepared under a contract with the European Commission, 
who requested and paid for the report. In terms of breadth and depth (and 
also, at 446 pages, length) it is probably the most comprehensive study of 
alcohol in a European context. It is, in part, an exhaustive survey of a massive 
literature base. In AB’s words, their report ‘is an expert synthesis of published 
reviews, systematic reviews, meta-analyses and individual papers, as well as 
an analysis of data made available by the European Commission and the 
World Health Organisation’.  
The pricing and taxation options considered by AB reach familiar conclusions. 
They estimate that a 10% rise in EU alcohol prices would prevent over 9,000 
deaths occurring in the following year. Approximately €13bn of additional tax 
revenues would result. AB reflect on this in a number of ways, not least by 
looking at the paradox involved in calling for higher alcohol taxes while at the 
same time observing significant production subsidies via the Common 
Agricultural Policy (worth around €1.5bn per annum to alcohol producers).  
AB conclude: 
Minimum tax rates for all alcoholic beverages should be increased in line with 
inflation, should be at least proportional to the alcoholic content of all 
beverages and should at least cover the external costs of alcohol as 
determined by an agreed and standardised methodology. Member states 
should retain the flexibility to use taxes to deal with specific problems that may 
arise with specific alcoholic beverages, such as those that prove to be 
appealing to young people.  
The pan-European approach to alcohol policy has, unsurprisingly, been led by 
the European Commission. Many of the reports and studies submitted to the 
commission, like the AB analysis (many of which have been at the request of 
the Commission) have studied and reached orthodox and consistent 
conclusions about pricing and taxation (as well as comprehensively covering 
many or all of the non-price and taxation aspects). Clearly, this is a sensitive 
area for the Commission: alcohol pricing and taxation are, for the most part, 
the responsibility of national governments. The EU has set minimum excise 
rates but this amounts to the limit of its policy reach in this area. It is worth 
noting that the minimum excise duty on wine is 0%: along with the other 
minimum excise duties this was first set in 1992. The Commission has tried to 
revisit these rates but has not, for the most part, been successful. It has, for 
example, tried but failed to inflation index excise duties. Harmonisation of 
excise duties has also been a long standing goal of the EU (not least because 
cross-border shopping represents an obvious problem when taxes vary). The 
1992 minimum duties were the result of efforts that can be traced back to the 
1970s; full harmonisation has yet to take place. Hence much of the 
Commission’s - extensive - work is focused on non-tax and price policies. 
One controversial area has been minimum or social reference prices. As 
discussed above, the debate in countries like Australia has focused on the 
free gift to retailers’ profit margins that is explicit in any move to set minimum 
prices. In Europe, similar concerns have been evident but there has tended to 
be a greater focus on competition law. There is some concern that minimum 
prices could violate European law, but the ruling by the Scottish Court has 
ruled that this is not the case.  
Precedent, some claim, has been set by the Commission and European Court 
of Justice which ruled that minimum prices for cigarettes (in Austria and 
Ireland) were contrary to competition law. The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) case of Commission v Ireland found that the pricing policy operated by 
Ireland for tobacco products was capable of undermining competition by 
preventing producers/importers from taking advantage of lower cost prices so 
as to offer more attractive retail selling prices and, therefore, was not 
compatible with EU law.  
The Scottish High Court judgment referred to this given that the petitioners 
(Scottish Whiskery Association, etc) relied on it in their challenge to MUP: 
"The recent tobacco cases (Commission v France, Commission v Austria, and 
Commission v Ireland) are not authority for the petitioners' primary 
proposition. The issue in each case was whether the national provisions 
were contrary to Article 9(1) of Council Directive 95/59/EC. The court held 
that Article 36 TFEU provided no defence to the breach of Article 9(1) of 
the Directive. Article 36 could be relied upon only to justify a 
contravention of Article 34 or 35. It could not be relied upon to justify 
breaches of other provisions. There was no scope for it to justify breach 
of a provision such as Article 9(1) (which dealt with a matter in relation 
to which there had been harmonization)". 
 
This suggests that the Irish ECJ Tobacco case held that Irish 
legislation imposing a minimum cigarette price was unlawful. This is 
because the ECJ Irish tobacco case was based on a specific directive 
concerning excise duties on tobacco which provided that the maximum retail 
price was to be set by manufacturers. The ECJ's objection then was not to 
the interference with the free movement of goods but that the Irish system 
undermined "the freedom of producers and importers to determine their 
maximum retail price, guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 9(1) of 
Directive 95/59". 
Interestingly, one of the judgements of the ECJ ruled that while public health 
considerations were clearly important, they could be achieved via taxation, 
rather than minimum prices. The UK has nevertheless recently flirted with the 
idea of minimum prices for alcohol products (see below).   
If the EU has been unable to make progress on tax raising and harmonisation, 
many of the reports that it has commissioned continue to make 
recommendations. For example, a (relatively) recent RAND (2009)36 study 
draws familiar conclusions and makes equally familiar recommendations: 
1. The RAND report explores the ‘...extensive evidence, built over decades of 
scientific research, that alcohol taxation can be an effective policy measure 
to curb harmful and hazardous alcohol consumption’. 
2. The real value of alcohol taxation has fallen in many member states. 
3. Alcohol excise duty rates should rise by at least the level of inflation and 
incomes. 
4. Cross border shopping is a real problem. Ideally, taxes have to converge 
from the bottom up. 
5. Significant EU-wide tax increases are politically unlikely. 
6. Competition concerns lead to a preference for a ban on below cost selling 
(although the long term consequences of such a move for alcohol have not 
been studied in any great depth).  
Europe is mostly a story about the impasse between the Commission and 
member states, between what the Commission would like to do, given the 
evidence, and what it is able to do, given that taxation powers lie, for the most 
part, with member states - who have displayed a marked reluctance to do 
very much. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Government and other interested parties in the UK have, to a considerable 
extent, followed a parallel path taken in other countries such as Canada and 
Australia. While there are some differences of approach, method and data, 
the similarities are striking. There is, for example, a very large literature 
dealing with the data on alcohol consumption and the associated harms. 
According to the National Statistics Office, there were 8,748 alcohol related 
deaths in the UK in 2011, twice as many as were recorded in the early 1990s 
(although there is a suggestion that the number of fatalities may have broadly 
stabilised over the past few years).  
Scotland has legislated for a minimum unit price on alcohol but this is now 
subject to both domestic and overseas legal challenge. This seems to have 
affected policy elsewhere in the UK (see below). 
Of the numerous studies and reports that we analysed, a noteworthy piece of 
research is the 2010 RAND37 ‘Preliminary assessment of the economic 
impacts of alcohol pricing policy in the UK’, commissioned by the UK Home 
Office. 
As we noted in our assessment of the Australian evidence and research base, 
economic assessments of different alcohol taxation systems are 
comparatively thin on the ground. The UK RAND researchers also note that 
‘literature on the economic impacts of the different alcohol pricing policies 
remains surprisingly scarce, despite the passionate debate about the potential 
winners and losers from these measures. Furthermore, the complexity of the 
alcohol supply-chain and the long-run implications of the pricing policies are 
inadequately researched and there are therefore many uncertainties 
regarding effects in the longer-term’. The UK RAND study is also particularly 
relevant to our research in that it is one of the very few pieces of research that 
takes an in-depth look at our three main areas of interest: taxation, minimum 
pricing and below cost selling. The main findings of the report are relatively 
straightforward: 
1. The evidence base associated with minimum pricing is ‘considerably 
smaller’ than the one associated with taxation. What evidence there is 
suggests that minimum pricing can be effective, particularly as it tends to 
target young, hazardous and other harmful drinkers. There is not enough 
research into the longer run consequences of minimum pricing and the 
impact (or unintended consequences), if any, on things like tobacco or 
cannabis consumption.    
2. The available literature on below cost selling is even smaller than that 
associated with minimum pricing. Researchers have tended to focus on the 
effects of price promotions (things like two-for-one) rather than below cost 
selling per se (such promotions increase consumption, particularly binge 
drinking and associated harms). 
3. Taxation has been extensively studied. The evidence is reasonably 
unambiguous: consumption falls and, generally, government revenue is 
raised, subject to the size of the tax increase and the price elasticity of 
demand. It is extremely difficult to establish the ‘optimum’ level of taxation: 
the literature is largely silent on the empirical estimation of this. 
Another recent UK based study that is relevant to our analysis was produced 
by the Institute for Fiscal Studies earlier this year (IFS, 2013)38. This study, 
like many of its peers, was in large part a response to the current 
government’s attempt to build on the efforts of previous administrations to 
curb alcohol abuse. The IFS concluded: 
1. Because heavy drinkers tend to buy cheaper and stronger alcohol, policy 
should be directed to raising the price of that type of alcohol. 
2. Heavy drinkers do not typically avail of quantity based special offers 
(proposed by the Government, already implemented in Scotland). Banning 
these kinds of promotions is not a well-targeted policy. 
3. It would be better to target strong alcohol rather than cheap alcohol. 
4. Higher excise taxes as in (3) would result in higher tax revenues. Minimum 
unit prices enhance retail profit margins and would lead to falls in 
government revenue 
5. A volumetric target of 45p per unit of alcohol would reduce tax revenue by 
approximately £290m and raise industry income by around £840m. 
6. The IFS proposes a reform of excise taxes which essentially corresponds to 
the tiered volumetric approach (they do not use this terminology) discussed 
above in our analysis of the Australian approach. Their ‘illustration’ 
suggests a tax schedule starting at 20p per unit of alcohol for wines and 
spirits for the first 1% of ABV and 7.1p for other alcohol. Both rates increase 
by 0.6p per unit for each 1% increase in ABV. This is an illustration - they 
acknowledge it may not be ‘optimal’: further research is required on this. 
7. Lower income households that consume relatively large quantities of 
stronger alcohol would be hardest hit by this policy. The extra £980m in tax 
revenues could, if desired, be used to mitigate some of the consequences 
of this. 
In summary, the IFS come out strongly on the side of those researchers and 
policymakers in Australia that advocate for a tiered volumetric approach. 
As mentioned above, there have been several policy initiatives in the UK, not 
least in Scotland. Specifically, the Westminster Government proposed to 
follow its Scottish counterpart and to introduce, amongst other things, 
minimum unit pricing and a ban on certain types of promotional discounts. A 
period of consultation has just concluded, with the Government announcing 
last month that: 
1. England and Wales will not introduce a minimum unit price for alcohol. It is 
a policy that ‘will remain under consideration......[but] we do not yet have 
enough concrete evidence that its introduction would be effective in 
reducing harms associated with problem drinking. 
2. England and Wales will not ban ‘multi-buy’ promotions. 
3. England and Wales will ban the sale of alcohol below the level of excise 
duty plus VAT. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, health lobbies greeted these developments with 
grave dismay, while they were welcomed by industry groups. The 
Government did cite on-going legal challenges to the recent Scottish decision 
to impose unit pricing; the Scotch Whiskey Association chose the occasion of 
the Westminster Government’s latest decision to remind us that they still think 
the Scottish minimum pricing breaches competition law.  
The UK Government has not rejected outright the use of MUP: it remains a 
policy under consideration, but it will not be taken forward at present.  
Our assessment of the global evidence base leaves us slightly mystified as to 
why the UK chose to go this route.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IRISH CONTEXT 
 
Introduction 
Alcohol plays a very important and complex role in Irish life and in Irish 
society. It is widely used for purposes of enjoyment and sociability, and the 
alcohol industry does make a very significant contribution to the Irish economy 
through employment, to the Exchequer finances, and it is a key part of the 
Irish tourism offering. However, it also has many negative effects. Under-age 
drinking is a significant problem and this early addiction to alcohol results in 
many short and longer-term problems for those who consume to excess. In 
addition to the direct effects of alcohol, there are also many negative 
externalities associated with excessive consumption.  
In a key report published by the Department of Health in 201239 the negative 
impacts of alcohol are laid out very clearly. Alcohol is estimated to have been 
responsible for at least 88 deaths every month in 2008; 1 in 4 deaths in young 
men is estimated to be due to alcohol; it is estimated to be a contributory 
factor in half of all suicides and in deliberate self-harm; it increases the risk of 
more than 60 medical conditions; it results in more than 2,000 beds being 
occupied every night in Irish acute hospitals and over one-quarter of injuries 
presenting to emergency departments; it accounts for over half of attendances 
at specialized addiction treatment clinics; it is associated with harm to the 
baby and is a significant factor in unplanned pregnancies; it is a significant 
contributor to domestic violence and crime; and it undermines worker 
productivity in the economy. 
The OECD40 estimates that adults over the age of 15 in Ireland consumed 
11.9 litres of alcohol per capita in 2010, which is the 7th highest in the EU-27 
and is almost twice as much as the lowest consuming country, Italy. Between 
1980 and 2010, consumption per capita in Ireland grew by 24 %, compared to 
an average decline of 15 % in the EU-27.  
Clearly, Ireland has a serious problem with alcohol consumption and all 
possible policy options should be explored in order to address the problem. 
Although the alcohol industry makes a significant economic contribution to 
Ireland’s economy, this is far outweighed by the direct and indirect costs that 
excessive consumption of alcohol imposes on the Irish economy and society. 
 
 
 
 
Alcohol Sales & Pricing in Ireland 
The Irish alcoholic beverages market has undergone a significant structural 
change over the past decade. Expenditure on alcohol (off-trade and on-trade) 
peaked at €7.2 billion in 2007. It then weakened in line with the sharp 
deterioration in domestic economic conditions. In addition to this economic 
related decline in expenditure on alcohol, the pattern of consumption has also 
changed significantly, with a significant switch from pub sales to the off-trade 
sector. The off-trade sector is comprised of specialist off-licenses and mixed 
trade outlets, which are defined as retail outlets that combine a mix of food, 
grocery, petrol, or other products with alcohol sales.  
The switch from on-trade to off-trade consumption of alcohol is being driven 
by many factors and has many consequences, most of which are not 
desirable. Strict drink driving laws, the smoking ban in pubs and the price of 
alcohol in pubs, are generally regarded as the three contributory factors 
impacting negatively on pub sales. On the other hand, alcohol is much 
cheaper and more convenient in the off-trade sector, and is particularly 
favoured by young drinkers.   
Table 3 examines the trend in overall consumer expenditure on goods and 
services and the trend in expenditure on Alcohol Beverages between 2000 
and 2012 in current price terms. The peak in overall consumer expenditure 
occurred in 2008 at €94.16 billion and the peak in expenditure on Alcoholic 
Beverages occurred in 2007 at €7.23 billion. Between 2007 and 2010, overall 
consumer expenditure declined by 11.2 % and expenditure on Alcohol 
Beverages (including pub sales) declined by 13.5 % over the same period. 
Expenditure on Alcoholic Beverages subsequently increased, with an 
increase of 1.6 % between 2010 and 2012. Expenditure on Alcoholic 
Beverages accounted for 9.6 % of total consumer expenditure in 2000, but 
this declined significantly to 7.4 % in 2008. It has subsequently increased to 
7.7 %.  
Detailed data on the breakdown of expenditure on Alcoholic Beverages 
between the on-trade and the off-trade are not publicly available. However, it 
is clear that there has been a marked growth in alcohol consumption in the 
home. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2006, the value of alcohol 
consumed in the home increased by around 104 %, while over the same 
period the value of alcohol consumed in licensed premises increased by just 
14.8 %. In 2000, the value of alcohol consumed in the home is estimated to 
have accounted for 13.9 % of total alcohol consumed – this had jumped to 
22.4 % by 2012. In volume terms, alcohol consumed in the home is likely to 
be closer to 50% of the total. 
 
 Table 3: Consumption of Personal Income on Alcohol 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGES 
(INC PUBS) €m 
4,996 6,376 6,803 7,230 6,966 6,326 6,253 6,277 6,355 
% OF TOTAL 
CONSUMER 
SPENDING 
9.6% 8.3% 8.1% 7.8% 7.4% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.7% 
TOTAL 
CONSUMPTION 
51,957 76,850 84,160 92,603 94,162 83,294 82,200 82,380 82,634 
 
Source: ‘National Income & Expenditure 2012’, CSO. 
Recent Trends in Retail Sales 
The retail sales series covers bar sales, but not alcohol sales in the off-trade. 
Figure 1 show the trend in overall retail sales in both value and volume terms 
between 2005 and 2012.  
Figure 1: Retail Sales in the Bar Sector 
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Between the peak of retail spending in 2007 and 2012 overall retail sales 
declined by 24.2% in value terms and by 19.4 % in volume terms. Bar sales 
over the same period declined by 30.5 % in value terms and by 32.7 % in 
volume terms. Bar sales as measured by the CSO include sales of food, soft 
drinks and alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises, and any off-
license sales in the pub. Anecdotal evidence from the bar trade indicates 
clearly that the key weakness has been in sales of alcoholic beverages. 
Recent Trends In Alcoholic Beverage Prices 
Over the past decade there has been a significant divergence in the price 
trend of alcoholic beverages sold in the on-trade and the off-trade. Off-license 
alcoholic beverage prices have increased by just 0.2 % over the period from 
2003 to 2013, while the price of alcoholic beverage sold in licensed premises 
has been significantly greater.  
Table 4: Price Trends  
PRODUCT % CHANGE JAN 2003-JULY 2013 
OFF-LICENSE  
Alcoholic Beverages +0.2% 
-Spirits +0.3% 
-Wine +5.3% 
-Beer -5.5% 
LICENSED PREMISES  
All Products +24.3% 
-Soft Drinks & Mineral 
Water 
+25.6% 
-Spirits +23.0% 
-Wine +19.1% 
-Beer +25.6% 
CPI +38.7% 
Source: CSO, Detailed CPI Indices 
Figure 2: Alcoholic Beverage Price Trends 
 
Source: CSO, Database Direct 
Figure 2 highlights the diverging trends in alcoholic beverage prices sold in 
the on-trade and the off-trade. Significant price compression has occurred in 
the off-trade, which highlights a very serious issue from a social and a public 
health perspective. The pub traditionally plays an important social and 
economic function in Irish life and in Irish society. The rise of the off-license 
trade at the expense of the licensed trade is having serious consequences – 
young people are increasingly consuming alcohol purchased cheaply in the 
off-trade and fewer people are consuming alcohol in the relatively controlled 
pub environment.  
One of the significant factors that have given rise to the marked price 
divergence between the on-trade and the off-trade has been the abolition of 
the ban on below invoice price selling in 2006. 
The Groceries Order 
The original Groceries Order was introduced in 1956 in order to attempt to 
abolish the practice of resale price maintenance. This practice occurred where 
suppliers set prices and keep them artificially high. The Order was amended 
in 1980 to ban below cost advertising, and again in 1987. The 1987 
amendment created the Restrictive Practices Order, which made below 
invoice selling and ‘hello money’ illegal on some grocery goods for human 
consumption. The Order covered ‘grocery goods for human consumption 
(excluding fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, fresh and frozen meat, fresh fish and 
frozen fish which has undergone no processing other than freezing with or 
without the addition of preservatives) and intoxicating liquors not for 
consumption on the premises, and such household necessaries (other than 
foodstuffs) as are ordinarily sold in grocery shops, and includes grocery goods 
designated as ‘own label’, ‘generic’ or other similar description’’.  
The main purpose of the 1987 Restrictive Practices (Groceries) Order was to 
ban below invoice price selling with the objective of reducing the 
concentration in the retail industry and preventing predatory pricing.  
In March 2006, the Order was abolished by the Minister for Enterprise Trade 
and employment. It was abolished on the basis that it had kept the price of the 
vast majority of grocery products in Ireland at an artificially high level by 
allowing suppliers to specify minimum prices below which products cannot be 
sold.  
When the order was abolished it was argued by its opponents that it would 
result in significantly lower prices for the consumer. The evidence following 
the abolition of the Order did not vindicate these arguments. 
Table 5 shows the change in price of goods previously subject to the 
Groceries Order and goods not subjected to it over two time periods – the first 
being the two-year period following its abolition and the second period covers 
from its abolition to December 2010, when the CSO ceased publishing this 
particular dataset.  
Table 5: Price Change for Grocery Order & Non-Grocery Order Items 
 MARCH 2006-MARCH 
2008 
MARCH 2006-DECEMBER 
2010 
Groceries Order Items +8.0% -0.2% 
Non-Groceries Order Items +6.1% -6.8% 
Alcoholic Beverages Off-
License 
-0.2% -10.4% 
Licensed Premises +8.6% +9.4% 
Overall Consumer Prices +10.4% +5.6% 
Source: CSO 
 Between March 2006 and March 2008: 
1. Overall consumer prices in the economy increased by 10.4 % 
2. The price of items previously covered by the Groceries Order 
increased by 8 %; 
3. The price of items not covered by the Groceries Order increased by 
6.1 % ; and 
4. The price of alcoholic beverages sold in off-licenses declined by 0.2 %.  
Between March 2006 and December 2010: 
5. Overall consumer prices in the economy increased by 5.6 %; 
6. The price of items previously covered by the Groceries Order declined 
by 0.2 %; 
7. The price of items not covered by the Groceries Order declined by 6.8 
%; and 
8. The price of alcoholic beverages sold in off-licenses declined by 10.4 
%.  
The abolition of the Groceries Order in March 2006 did not give rise to the 
expected bonanza for consumers, as its opponents had suggested. Instead, 
following the abolition of the Order it is clear that the key impact in terms of 
price declines was seen in the price of alcohol sold in off-licenses. From a 
social and public health perspective, it is difficult to argue that this was a 
desirable outcome. It is a clear case of the law of unintended consequences. 
Those unintended consequences have included below cost selling of alcohol, 
growth in the trend of out of pub drinking, and an escalation of the youth 
drinking culture. 
TAX REVENUES FROM ALCOHOL 
 
Alcoholic beverages are taxed in two ways in Ireland – excise duties and VAT.  
The Excise Duty is a specific tax, where the tax is an amount of money per 
unit volume of the good. In the case of alcohol, the excise tax is an absolute 
amount of money per unit of alcohol contained in the alcoholic beverage. 
Specifically, it is generally expressed as an excise duty per hectolitre of pure 
alcohol (HPLA). 
The structure of alcohol excise taxes is governed by an EU Directive41 which 
specifies that the tax base for wine and cider should be the volume of liquid, 
whereas the tax base for spirits and beer is the alcohol content. 
On the other hand VAT is an ad valorem tax that is applied as a percentage of 
the selling value or price. A VAT rate of 23 % currently applies to alcohol 
products in Ireland.  
The Excise Duty is applied at the same level regardless of whether the 
alcoholic beverage is sold in the on-trade or the off-trade. On the other hand 
the VAT rate is applied to the value/price of the product. VAT is charged on 
the excise amount, meaning that a VAT increase causes price to rise by the 
excise and a further 23 % of the excise increase.  
The sale of alcoholic products represents a significant source of revenue for 
the Exchequer. Table 6 shows the tax take from alcoholic beverages broken 
down into VAT and Excise duty between 2002 and 2012.  
Table 6: Tax Revenues Collected from Alcoholic Beverages 
(€M) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
VAT 897 931 986 1,022 1,073 1,122 1,089 1,074 1,011 1,014 1,097* 
Excise 958 989 773 1,038 1,077 1,131 1,070 968 826 830 846 
Total 1,855 1,920 1,759 2,060 2,150 2,253 2,159 2,042 1,937 1,844 1,943 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners (*2012 VAT figure is provisional) 
 
 
Figure 3: Net Excise Receipts from Alcoholic Products 
Source: Revenue Commissioners 
Figure 4: VAT Receipts from Alcoholic Products 
Source: Revenue Commissioners 
The total tax take from alcoholic beverages peaked at €2.25 billion in 2007 
and declined by 18.2 % to €1.84 billion in 2011. It increased by 5.4 % in 2012 
to reach €1.94 billion.  
Alcohol related taxes accounted for 5.3% of total Exchequer tax revenues in 
2012. This stood at 6.3 % in 2002, but had declined to a low of 4.7 % in 2006.  
In Ireland there are a range of different Excise Duties applying to different 
alcoholic products. The Excise Duty payable in general increases with the 
alcoholic content of the beverage. 
The following are some of the Excise duties applying in Ireland: 
 For Intermediate Products: Still products exceeding 18% are taxed at a 
rate of €537.81 per hl, and still products not exceeding 15 % are taxed 
at a lower rate of €370.64 per hl. Sparkling intermediate products are 
taxed at a higher rate of €741.28 per hl. 
 For Other Fermented Beverages: Cider and Perry – still and sparkling 
not exceeding 2.8 % volume are taxed at a rate of €40.08 per hl. Still 
Cider and Perry exceeding 8.5 % volume are taxed at a higher rate of 
€262.92 per hl. Sparkling Cider and Perry exceeding 8.5 % volume are 
taxed at a higher rate of €525.85 per hl.  
 Wine: Still and Sparkling Wine not exceeding 5.5 % volume is taxed at a 
rate of €123.51 per hl of product. Still wine at 11% volume is taxed at a 
rate of €370.64 per hl. Still wine exceeding 15 % volume is taxed at a 
rate of €537.81 per hl of product. Sparkling wine exceeding 5.5 % 
volume is taxed at a rate of €741.27. 
 Beer: An excise rate of €9.56 per hl % of alcohol in the beer is 
applicable to beer exceeding 1.2 % volume but not exceeding 2.8 % 
volume. Beer exceeding 0.5 % volume but not exceeding 1.2 % volume 
is zero rated. Beer at 5% volume is taxed at €95.65 per hl. 
Table 7 outlines selected excise duty rates in a number of EU countries. Of 
the 14 countries considered, Ireland has the third highest duty for Spirits, 
the highest for Wine, the second highest for Intermediate Products and the 
fourth highest for Beer.  
Table7: Comparative Excise Duty Rates 
COUNTRY SPIRITS (€ 
per HLPA) 
STILL WINE 
(€ Per HL 
11%) 
INTERMEDIATE 
PRODUCTS (€ per HL at 
18% Vol) 
BEER (€ per 
HL at 5% Vol) 
Austria 1,000 0 406 500 
Belgium 1,962 480 617 428 
Finland 4,340 2,836 3,472 2,990 
France 1,689 33 1,018 720 
Germany 1,303 0 850 197 
Greece 2,550 0 590 650 
Ireland 3,685 3,369 2,988 1,913 
Italy 800 0 381 588 
Luxembourg 1,041 0 372 198 
Netherlands 1,594 760 784 718 
Portugal 1,192 0 363 373 
Spain 830 0 309 199 
Sweden 5,918 2,315 2,962 1,959 
UK * 3,535 3,037 2,475 2,395 
 
Source: Spirits Europe, May 2013. *Exchange Rate 0.7983 
Figure 5 compares the price of alcohol calculated on a Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) basis by Eurostat for a range of countries in Europe. Ireland is 
the third most expensive country and is 62 % higher than the EU-27 average. 
Ireland is 13.3 % more expensive than the UK.  
The price differential with the UK is very significant given that a land border is 
shared with Northern Ireland, and sea and air access to Great Britain is very 
strong. This gives rise to serious concerns about the potential for cross-border 
purchasing of cheaper alcohol, which could negate the public health objective 
of alcohol pricing measures, and undermine tax revenues from alcohol.  
Figure 5: Comparative Price Level Indices for Alcoholic Beverages 
 
Source: Eurostat 99/2013, June 2013 
AFFORDABILITY OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN IRELAND 
 
There is a considerable body of international research showing that 
consumption of alcohol is sensitive to its price. There is an inverse 
relationship between price and consumption – if price rises, consumption will 
tend to fall, and if price falls consumption will tend to rise. So in many senses 
alcohol behaves like a normal good, but it differs in significant ways also. For 
example, alcohol tends to be an addictive good that if drank excessively can 
have detrimental effects on the health and behavior of the person consuming 
the alcohol, but it can also have significant negative externalities attaching. A 
negative externality occurs when the consumption of an item creates costs for 
others who are not party to the consumption in question. Such externalities 
could include road traffic accidents, domestic violence, pressure on the health 
service, and many other negative effects on broader society.  
Much of the research on the consumption of alcohol tends to focus on the 
impact of price changes on consumption. However, there is a body of 
research which has also examined the impact of changes in income on the 
consumption of alcohol. Rabinovich et al36 developed an alcohol affordability 
index, which was later applied with some amendments by Carragher and 
Chalmers15 to the Australian situation.  
Alcohol affordability seeks to measure people’s ability to buy alcohol, which is 
a function of price and disposable income. The affordability index developed 
by Rabinovich et al is calculated by measuring the ratio of a real disposable 
income index to an index presenting the relative price of alcohol. The index of 
the relative price of alcohol is calculated by measuring the ratio between the 
broad Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the trend in alcohol prices. 
Using this methodology, Rabinovich et al showed that since 1996, alcohol has 
become more affordable across the EU countries examined, apart from Italy. 
The analysis shows that across the EU, 84 % of the increase in alcohol 
affordability was driven by increases in disposable income, and 16 % was 
driven by changes in alcohol prices. This is due to the fact that while incomes 
went up considerably across the EU, the relative price of alcoholic beverages 
has remained relatively stable, or fallen at a lower rate than the income 
increases. The conclusion reached is that there is a positive relationship 
between alcohol affordability and alcohol consumption in the EU. They 
showed that in the short run there is an elasticity of demand of 0.22 and in the 
long run 0.32. This means that for every 1% increase in affordability, in the 
long-run there is an increase of 0.32 % in consumption.  
The policy conclusion reached by the authors is that with studies such as 
theirs and others showing that ‘the price and affordability of alcohol do impact 
on levels of harmful and hazardous alcohol consumption and that policy 
makers should consider measures affecting the price of alcohol, and therefore 
its affordability, to help reduce alcohol related harms’.   
CJP Economic Consultants derived an affordability index for Ireland based on 
the model developed by Rabinovich et al. We used the CPI, the CSO’s 
alcohol price index and real personal disposable income derived from the 
CSO’s National Income & Expenditure Accounts.  
Figure 6: Alcohol Affordability Index for Ireland 
Source: CJP Consultants based on model developed by Rabinovich et al. 
The analysis for Ireland shows that between 1995 and 2007 the affordability 
index increased by 102 %. This was driven by an increase of 111.2 % in real 
disposable incomes, while alcohol prices increased by marginally more than 
the CPI.  Since 2008, affordability has fallen by 11.1 %, due to a decline of 
just over 10 % in real disposable incomes, while alcohol prices declined 
modestly relative to the CPI.  
It is clear that affordability has been an important driver of the growth in 
alcohol consumption in Ireland.
CROSS BORDER ISSUES 
Fiscal harmonization was an important element of the development of the 
Single European Market, whose main aim was to create a market with as few 
internal barriers to trade as possible. As part of the process there was a 
significant relaxation of limits on personal imports of excisable goods by 
domestic consumers which gave rise to a significant increase in cross-border 
shopping, which in turn created considerable uncertainty across the EU for 
excise duties collected from alcohol and tobacco sales in particular.  
Excise duty rates are not harmonized across the EU. Council Directive 
92/83/EEC instructs member states on how to define the products and 
product categories to be taxed, and outlines the principles of how to set the 
excise duty rates for these products. Council Directive 92/84 EEC sets out a 
minimum excise duty rate for distilled spirits, beer and intermediate products. 
No minimum rate is set for wine and fermented beverages other than wine 
and beer. The minimum rates are binding on the products to which they apply, 
but member states are free to set their excise duty rates above the minimum 
level. The aim of these minimum tax rates was to avoid cross-border shopping 
between high and low-tax countries driving tax rates down towards the rates 
applying in the lowest-tax countries. Such a development would have had 
serious consequences for tax revenues. Above the minimum rate, significant 
variations in tax rates have developed.42 
Rabinovich et al37 conducted three case studies on cross border shopping for 
alcohol for personal use following the reduction in controls on imports for 
personal use. They looked at UK-France, Finland-Estonia, and Sweden-
Denmark-Germany. In all of these cases significant differentials in alcohol 
taxation and in the price of alcohol existed. These differentials when 
combined with the relaxation of personal controls resulted in a significant 
increase in cross-border alcohol purchases. The increase in cross border 
shopping had a significant impact on the tax base of the countries concerned, 
but significantly, increased cross-border shopping also led to a significant 
increase in consumption of alcohol in the receiving countries. The authors 
concluded that not only did consumers change the location of their alcohol 
purchases; they also increased their total alcohol consumption. However, in 
Sweden and Finland in particular, and to a lesser extent in the other countries 
studied, consumption levelled off or even dropped off somewhat once 
consumers adjusted to the availability of cheap alcohol in neighbouring 
countries. The authors also provided evidence of a relationship between the 
reduction of controls on imports for personal use and alcohol-related harms in 
the countries examined.  
The three aforementioned case studies related to countries sharing sea 
borders, but clearly the issue is even greater for countries that share land 
borders. For Ireland, the land border with Northern Ireland is clearly a very 
significant issue.   
Beatty et al43 investigated household purchasing behavior in response to 
differing alcohol and tobacco taxes near an international border, using Norway 
as a case study. They found that large tax differentials near borders induce 
economically important tax avoidance behavior that may limit a government’s 
ability to raise revenue and potentially undermine the pursuit of important 
health and social policy goals. They found that revenues from highly taxed 
goods increase as distance from the border increases, reaching zero after 
about 2 ½ hours travel time. They showed a pattern of tax avoidance behavior 
through cross-border shopping on the part of an important number of 
Norwegian households resulting in significant loss of revenue for the 
government and possible increased health risk due to higher consumption of 
beer and tobacco products. They also found ‘cautious evidence ’that 
households near the border exhibit higher levels of the kinds of externalities 
these taxes were designed to prevent. 
Beatty et al conclude that the geography of a jurisdiction will influence the 
effectiveness of consumption or sin taxes. Within a given jurisdiction, uniform 
consumption taxes may create large regional differences – the further away 
from a border that households are, the more tax on a per unit basis they will 
pay compare to households near the border. They suggest that this creates 
the scope for international agreements, such as a minimum tax on alcohol 
and tobacco, to mitigate the problem. However, the fact remains that the 
impact of high taxes will be far less effective near a border with a jurisdiction 
with much lower tax rates. 
In any consideration of the taxation of alcoholic beverages in Ireland, issues 
relating to the impact that differential tax treatment of items such as tobacco 
and alcohol can have on cross-border shopping are obviously very important. 
The fear that any further widening of the tax differentials between the UK and 
Ireland could lead to a further diversion of sales and tax revenues to Northern 
Ireland in particular is a very real one. In the past we have periodically seen 
significant numbers of shoppers from Ireland going to Northern Ireland to 
purchase items ranging from food to alcoholic beverages, to electrical 
equipment and clothing. This trend is driven by factors such as the exchange 
rate between sterling and the euro, and the relative price differential on both 
sides of the border, which can in part be attributed to tax differentials. 
Distance from the border is also a very important consideration, with those 
who live closest to the border likely to shop in Northern Ireland to a much 
greater extent than those living further from it. 
Not enough research has been conducted on the issue of cross-border 
shopping in Ireland, but it clearly is a significant issue for businesses and tax 
authorities on both sides of the border.  
Cross border trade picked up dramatically in the run up to Christmas 2008 
and this continued into 2009. This prompted the Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners and the Central Statistics Office (CSO)44 to conduct some 
research into the impact of the developments in 2008. The report published 
estimated that in 2008, the value of cross border shopping was in the range of 
€350 million to €550 million, up from between €210 million and €340 million in 
2007. The resultant loss to the Irish Exchequer from these excursions north is 
estimated to be between €58 million and €90 million in VAT and excise duties, 
and between €15 million and €24 million in corporation tax receipts. These 
estimates do not take account of the income tax losses as a result of the 
displaced workers in the retail sector in the Republic of Ireland. The report 
also predicted that there would be a further increase of between €100 million 
and €150 million in cross border shopping in 2009.  
It is clear that the creation of the Single European Market has enabled 
consumers on both sides of the border to adjust spending patterns quickly in 
response to any changes in the price differentials between the two regions. 
Four factors were identified by the 2009 report as being the main drivers of 
price differentials. These factors are business costs, taxes, profit margins and 
currency exchange rates. The exchange rate factor is particularly important. 
During 2008, the euro appreciated in value from £0.74 to £0.96, which 
represents an appreciation of almost 30 % in the value of the euro.  
It is important to note that while important, the creation of the Single European 
Market was not the only factor. The issue of cross-border shopping pre-dated 
the creation of the single market, as evidenced for example by a study of 
cross-border shopping carried out by the ESRI45 in 1988 which estimated that 
the value of cross border shopping was between IR£150 million and IR£250 
million in 1986. 
There is a lack of quantifiable data and research on the issue of cross border 
shopping in Ireland. Apart from the aforementioned study carried out by the 
Office of the Revenue Commissioners and the CSO, not much is available. In 
2010, the CSO46 estimated that total household expenditure on shopping in 
Northern Ireland in the twelve months to the second quarter of 2010 was €418 
million. The equivalent figure for the previous twelve month period was 
estimated at €435 million. The CSO’s survey also suggested that 44 % of 
households bought alcohol on the shopping trips to Northern Ireland. In a 
price study conducted by the Revenue Commissioners in 201047, all alcohol 
prices in the Republic of Ireland were more expensive than in Northern 
Ireland. Stout was 19 % more expensive; wine was 12.4 % more expensive; 
lager was 37 % more expensive; and whiskey was 16.2 % more expensive. 
It is clear that in any consideration of the tax treatment of alcoholic beverages 
in Ireland, the issue of cross border shopping is a reasonably important 
consideration. However, it is also clear that sharp exchange rate movements 
tend to have the greatest influence on trends in cross border shopping, but tax 
differentials are also significant where the incidence of the tax falls on the 
consumer rather than the producer or the retailer. 
The Commission on Taxation recommended that the policy approach 
determining the level of excise duty applicable to alcohol products should take 
account of factors such as health outcome, public order issues, cross-border 
trade and other societal issues.  
It is not possible to predict how sterling will behave against the euro in the 
future, and it would not be prudent to base a public health policy on possible 
future exchange rate movements. Alcohol is causing significant societal and 
economic problems in Ireland and all options to reduce alcohol consumption 
must be considered. This could cause some problems with cross border 
shopping, particularly for retailers of alcohol in the border region, but that 
should not deter from such an important health issue.  
It would be very desirable if health and tax authorities on both sides of the 
border worked together to address this very important health issue. This is 
happening. The Irish Department of Health is working closely with its 
counterpart in Northern Ireland on alcohol issues. Following the outcomes of a 
consultation in Northern Ireland and the publication of the report of the 
National Substance Misuse Strategy in the Republic, both jurisdictions are 
seeking to develop the evidence base on the impact of a minimum unit price 
for alcohol in Northern Ireland and the Republic. Therefore, a health 
impact assessment is being commissioned in conjunction with Northern 
Ireland as part of the process of developing a legislative basis for 
minimum unit pricing. The health impact assessment will study the impact of 
different minimum prices on a range of areas such as health, crime and 
likely economic impact. 
POLICY OPTIONS IN IRELAND 
In a key report published by a steering group organized the Department of 
Health in 201248 the negative impacts of alcohol are laid out very clearly. 
Alcohol is estimated to have been responsible for at least 88 deaths every 
month in 2008; 1 in 4 deaths in young men is estimated to be due to alcohol; it 
is estimated to be a contributory factor in half of all suicides and in deliberate 
self-harm; it increases the risk of more than 60 medical conditions; it results in 
more than 2,000 beds being occupied every night in Irish acute hospitals and 
over one-quarter of injuries presenting to emergency departments; it accounts 
for over half of attendances at specialized addiction treatment clinics; it is 
associated with harm to the baby and is a significant factor in unplanned 
pregnancies; it is a significant contributor to domestic violence and crime; and 
it undermines worker productivity in the economy. 
Figure 7: Alcohol Consumption 15+ Years (2010 – Litres per Capita)  
Source: ‘Health at a Glance: Europe 2012’, OECD, 2012. 
The OECD40 estimates that adults over the age of 15 in Ireland consumed 
11.9 litres of alcohol per capita in 2010, which is the 7th highest in the EU-27 
and is almost twice as much as the lowest consuming country, Italy (Figure 7). 
Between 1980 and 2010, consumption per capita in Ireland grew by 24 %, 
compared to an average decline of 15 % in the EU-27.  
The Department of Health steering group sought to estimate the cost of 
alcohol abuse in Ireland in its 2012 report. 
It estimates the costs as follows: 
 Alcohol related illness cost the healthcare system €1.2 billion in 2007. 
This is comprised of €500 million in the acute hospital sector; €574 
million in GP and allied health services, and €104 million in mental 
health services; 
 Alcohol related crime cost an estimated €1.19 billion in 2007;  
 The cost of lost economic output due to alcohol was estimated to be 
€527 million in 2007. This is comprised of €330 million lost productivity 
due to alcohol-related work absences, and €197 million due to alcohol-
related injuries; and 
 Alcohol-related road accidents are estimated to have cost an estimated 
€530 million in 2007. 
In total alcohol-related problems are estimated to have cost Ireland €3.4 
billion in 2007. This is the estimated monetary calculation of the cost of 
alcohol abuse, but there are many other costs that cannot be quantified in 
monetary terms, but are still very significant.  
Apart from the costs of alcohol abuse, it is also important to recognize that the 
alcohol industry does make a very significant contribution to the Irish 
economy. In a report carried out for the Drinks Industry Group of Ireland 
(DIGI), Foley49 estimated that in 2009 the drinks industry made the following 
contribution to the Irish economy: 
 Personal expenditure on beverages was €7.185 billion in 2009; 
 Manufacturing in the drinks industry had a turnover of €2.95 billion in 
2008 and €1 billion in exports; 
 Drink manufacturers employed 4,263 people and expenditure on 
materials for further processing and energy totaled €1.1 billion; 
 In 2009 the retail segment of the drinks’ market was comprised of 
approximately 9,067 full on-licenses, 1,170 spirits off-licenses and 
3,705 wine off-licenses; 
 The on-trade provided 43,629 full-time job equivalents, and the off-
license sector provided approximately 2,850 full-time job equivalents; 
and  
 The alcohol manufacturing and retail industry contributed €2 billion in 
tax revenues to the Exchequer.  
It is clear in Ireland and elsewhere that the positive economic contribution of 
the alcohol industry is far outweighed by the negative direct and indirect 
effects of excessive consumption of alcohol. The National Substance Abuse 
Steering Group (2012) identified a number of actions that could be used to 
deal with the significant harm caused by alcohol use and misuse. The 
recommendations included: 
 Increase the price of alcohol so that it becomes less affordable; 
 Introduce a legislative basis for minimum pricing, along with a ‘social 
responsibility’ levy on the drinks industry; 
 Commence Section 9 (structural separation of alcohol from other 
products in supermarkets) of the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2008; 
 Introduce legislation and statutory codes to provide for a 9 p.m. 
watershed for alcohol advertising on TV and radio, and other controls 
on advertising; 
 Phase out drinks industry sponsorship of sport and other large public 
events by 2016; 
 Develop a system to monitor the enforcement of the provisions of the 
intoxicating liquor legislation; 
 Establish a Clinical Directorate to develop the clinical and 
organizational governance framework to underpin treatment and 
rehabilitation services; and 
 Develop early intervention guidelines for alcohol and substance use 
across all relevant sectors of the health and social care system. 
These recommendations are intended to achieve five key objectives: 
1. Reduce the supply of cheap alcohol; 
2. Control the availability of alcohol; 
3. Prevent the sale of alcohol to minors; 
4. Restrict alcohol marketing and sponsorship; and 
5. Reduce drink-driving. 
The authors of this report were specifically asked to consider the pricing 
issue, under 4 alternatives: 
1. Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP); 
2. The reintroduction of a ban on below cost selling; 
3. Making the sales price of alcohol cover at least VAT plus excise; and 
4. Excise/Fiscal Measures. 
The starting premise for this analysis is that the key way to curb alcohol 
consumption is to make it more expensive and less available. Numerous 
studies have been conducted to measure the price elasticity of alcohol, and 
while findings different for different drinks and for different jurisdictions, 
alcohol is a relatively inelastic consumer product. The average price elasticity 
of demand is around -0.5, which means that a 10 % increase in the price of 
alcohol will typically lead to a 5 % decline in consumption. The reason why 
alcohol is not more price sensitive is because it has certain addictive qualities 
and is also used socially. 
A pricing policy typically seeks to influence the price of alcohol with the 
intention of reducing consumption and minimizing alcohol-related damage.  
There are a number of different ways of increasing the price at which alcohol 
can be sold. 
Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) 
Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) is a policy that sets a statutory floor price per 
gram of alcohol, and alcohol could not be sold below that price. Such a 
measure would be primarily aimed at tackling the very low cost at which 
alcohol is sold in the off-trade sector, particularly supermarkets. The more 
units of alcohol a drink contains, the stronger it is and therefore the more 
expensive it is.  
MUP is not that common around the world, but is used in several Canadian 
provinces, at least partially. It has been widely recommended elsewhere 
(Australia, for example) but has yet to be adopted. 
The key advantage of MUP is that it is a targeted method that should ensure 
that products that are strong in alcohol are sold at a realistic or sensible price.  
The reality is that this policy would increase the price of drinks such as own-
brand spirits, high-strength beers and white cider, which have high alcohol 
content, but tend to be sold very cheaply in supermarkets and the off-license 
trade.  
There is considerable evidence to suggest that heavy drinkers or problem 
drinkers tend to buy cheaper alcohol and stronger alcohol than more 
moderate drinkers. See for example Institute for Fiscal Studies (2013)4. A 
policy aimed at raising the price of stronger alcohol will target those more 
likely to harm themselves or others, such as young adults and problem 
drinkers. The IFS study concludes that a minimum unit price is well targeted 
at increasing the relative price of cheap alcohol, but is much less well targeted 
at increasing the relative price of strong alcohol products. The IFS study 
suggests that MUP will reduce government revenues from alcohol taxes, and 
will lead to substantial windfall gains for alcohol retailers and manufacturers. 
The authors highlight the risk that these windfall gains could be used to fund 
activities that mitigate the effects of the policy, such as increased advertising 
or other promotional activities. On the other hand reformed excise taxes 
would increase government revenues. 
Hunt et al50 cite a lack of research on the impact of minimum unit prices in the 
Canadian provinces where it applies, but they cite strong evidence supporting 
the use of pricing policies in general to curb harmful consumption of alcohol. 
They believe that the most relevant point about minimum pricing as a tool to 
curb harmful drinking is that harmful drinkers tend to choose the cheapest 
drinks, suggesting the importance of minimum as well as average alcohol 
prices.  
Brennan et al51 examined the effect of different minimum prices on retailer 
revenue, on VAT and excise duty revenue, and in population expenditure on 
alcohol. Their analysis suggests that with price increases: spending is 
estimated to increase; changes in spending affect mostly harmful drinkers, 
with hazardous drinkers somewhat affected, and moderate drinkers least 
affected; annual retail sales value is estimated to increase; and effects on tax 
and excise duty are estimated to be relatively small.  
The Scottish Parliament has developed a system of Minimum Unit Pricing, 
under an Act of Parliament; Scottish Parliament – the Alcohol (Minimum 
Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012.This Act amended the Licensing Scotland Act 
205. The amendments make provision for a minimum price per unit of alcohol, 
which in effect will prohibit the sale of alcohol on licensed premises at a price 
below its minimum price.  
The formula for calculating the minimum price is MPU x S x V x 100. 
(Minimum Price per Unit x Strength of Alcohol x Volume in Litres x 100). As 
an example, if the minimum price per unit of alcohol is set at 50p; the strength 
of the alcohol is 14%; the volume is 75 cl; the minimum price at which that 
alcohol could be sold is £5.25 (£0.50 x 14% x 0.75 x 100). 
The Act was challenged in the Scottish courts by alcohol groups on the basis 
that is in in breach of the Act of Union; it is outside the legislative competence 
of the Scottish Parliament to modify the relevant articles of law as they relate 
to the freedom of trade; and it is incompatible with EU law on free trade.  
The claim of incompatibility with EU law is based on three arguments; 
minimum pricing is said to contravene Article 34 TFEU; it is said to be 
incompatible with the common organisation of the market relating to wine and 
certain other alcohol products; and is said to be in breach of Article 6(2) of 
Regulation (EC) 111/2008 relating to spirits. 
The Court of Session rejected the appeal and Lord Doherty stated that ‘none 
of the challenges to the minimum pricing measures is well founded’. 
The judgment was detailed but reached some very pertinent conclusions: 
 The provisions of the Act and proposed Order ‘do not restrict or seek to 
restrict the freedom of trade of, nor do they give any preference in 
trading conditions to, traders in either Scotland or England’. 
 ‘The reduction of alcohol consumption generally, and reduction of 
consumption by hazardous and harmful drinkers in particular, are both 
legitimate aims’.  
 ‘The initiative has been conceived and developed as a health initiative 
and that it enjoys prodigious support from health professionals and 
health agencies, and that there is not the slightest suggestion that it is 
a disguised restriction on trade’. 
 Alternative measures such as excise duty increases, would be less 
effective in achieving the legitimate aims which the minimum pricing 
measures pursue; 
 ‘There is literature and oral evidence that excise duty rises might not be 
passed on (or not passed on in full) to consumers. The potential 
problem does not arise under minimum pricing’. 
 ‘There is objective justification supporting the proportionality of the Act 
and the proposed minimum price’. 
The judgment of the Scottish Court provides some very interesting insights in 
to the issues surrounding MUP as a policy initiative. These insights should 
guide debate on the issue in Ireland. Paragraphs 36, 38 and 54 are quoted 
directly to illustrate the key points: 
 [36] ‘The aims of the measures were legitimate. An important aim - 
probably the more important one - was to target harmful and hazardous 
drinkers and reduce their consumption. The other aim was an overall 
reduction in consumption. The means of attaining both aims was by 
increasing the price of alcohol which was cheap relative to its strength. 
There was evidence which supported the view that harmful and hazardous 
drinkers tended to purchase disproportionate amounts of such alcohol, and 
that that applied no matter the income level of the drinker. There was 
also evidence that increasing the price of such alcohol using minimum unit 
pricing would be likely to lead to reductions in the consumption levels of 
such drinkers. There would also be likely to be a reduction in consumption 
levels across the population as a whole’. 
 
(38) ‘Increasing excise duty across the board would not be as effective in 
targeting harmful and hazardous drinkers. It would penalise the on-trade 
and the off-trade indiscriminately, whereas it was clear that the problem 
with cheap alcohol arose in the off-trade. It was not necessary to make 
higher price alcohol more expensive than it was. The excise duty 
directives required the same rate to be applied to wines of different 
strengths and the same rate to be applied to ciders of different strengths. 
Wine of 8.5% strength had to be taxed at the same rate as wine of 15% 
strength. Cider of 1.2% strength had to be taxed at the same rate as cider 
of 8.5% strength. That was not conducive to targeting alcohol which was 
cheap relative to its strength’. 
 
[54] ‘In my opinion it is clear that it is not an aim of the measures that 
alcohol consumption be eradicated. Nor is it an aim to make its cost 
prohibitive for all drinkers. The measures are intended to strike at 
alcohol misuse and overconsumption and to get people to build a healthy and 
sensible relationship with alcohol. The Parliament and the Ministers were 
aware that greater harm to health and life could be avoided if the minimum 
price was set higher than 50 pence per unit but the Ministers chose 50 pence 
per unit as the appropriate level. They were seeking to strike a reasonable 
balance between, on the one hand, public health and social benefits, and, on 
the other, intervention in the market’. 
It is important to remember that MUP is not just hitting high strength alcohol 
alone; it would provide a price bases for all beers, particularly those that are 
sold cheaply and which a consumed by young drinkers in Ireland. 
Ban on Below Cost Selling 
Bans on below cost selling are used in a small number of EU countries, and 
relate mainly to groceries.  As described earlier, Ireland had a ban on below 
cost selling on a range of items, but it was repealed in 2006. The removal of 
the order did not lead to a reduction in the price of most of the products 
covered by the order, but did have a significant impact on the price at which 
alcoholic beverages were sold in off-licenses and supermarkets.  
The main aim of a ban, as was the case in Ireland, is to prevent predatory 
pricing by large retailers in order to protect small retailers and small 
producers, and allow new entrants come in to the market. As Hunt et al point 
out, these bans typically do not set a minimum price for a product, but rather 
specify that a product cannot be sold at a price below the seller’s cost of doing 
business, or some proxy measure, such as below the cost of VAT plus excise 
duties, or the unit price invoiced by the supplier.  
Serious concerns have been raised, not least in Ireland, about the health 
impact of below-cost sales and other price promotions and discounts in the 
marketing of alcohol. Given the relationship between price and consumption 
of alcohol that has been demonstrated in numerous studies, it is clear that 
below cost selling of alcohol does increase the consumption of alcohol and 
that a ban on such practices would impact on the consumption of alcohol in a 
positive way.  
Considerable research has been conducted on the impact of price discounting 
and promotions on alcohol consumption. However, there is considerably less 
evidence on the impact of below cost selling. However, whether one 
considers promotions, special discounts or below cost selling, it is clear that if 
the price of alcohol comes down, consumption will increase and vice-versa. 
Brennan et al modelled the possible impacts of different restrictions on off-
trade price promotions and discounting in the UK, and found that a total ban 
on discounting would lead to a 2.8 % decline in consumption of alcohol. Kuo 
et al 52 conducted considerable research amongst US college students and 
concluded that the regulation of marketing practices such as low sale prices, 
promotions, and advertisements may be important strategies to reduce binge 
drinking on college campuses. Numerous other studies support this assertion 
in relation to alcohol sales to the general population.  
In an Irish context, it is clear since the removal of the ban on below cost 
selling in 2006, supermarket retailers are engaging in loss-leader activity – 
they are charging prices for alcohol that are below cost in order to attract 
shoppers in, who will buy other products whose prices have not been 
reduced. They can afford to do this because alcohol is such a small proportion 
of overall turnover. From an alcohol consumption perspective and a health 
perspective, this is not a positive development. Lower price increases 
consumption, particularly for young people and problem drinkers. 
A re-introduction of a ban on below-cost selling, like the Groceries’ Order, 
would not the optimal policy, as it is very hard to define what the ‘minimum 
price’ or the ‘cost’ actually is. 
Making the Sales Price Cover at Least VAT plus Excise 
A variation of a reintroduction of a ban on below cost selling would be an 
order preventing the sale of alcohol at a price that does not cover the VAT 
and excise payable on the product. By varying VAT rates or excise duty it 
would be possible to push up the price of alcohol and thereby have an impact 
on consumption. This is to be tried in England and Wales, according to the 
latest policy statement from the UK Government. There is very little empirical 
evidence of what the effects of this are likely to be. 
Excise / Fiscal Measures 
Alcoholic drinks have a relatively low elasticity of demand, derived from the 
nature of the need that alcohol fulfils. In the context of economic efficiency 
therefore, high rates of tax can be justified on this product. Furthermore, the 
relatively low elasticity of demand makes high taxation of alcoholic beverages 
a major source of revenue for government.  
The consumption of alcohol has negative externalities attaching – a negative 
externality occurs when the consumption of an item creates costs for others 
who are not parties to the transaction in question. Such negative externalities 
include road accidents, crime, pressure on the health service, and domestic 
violence. The market does not operate in a manner that allows those costs to 
be taken into account when consumption decisions are made, and so the 
level of consumption of such items is greater than what is socially optimal.  
Despite the relatively low price elasticity of demand, taxation will still have 
some impact on consumption and will alleviate some of the negative 
externalities associated with alcohol consumption through reduced demand 
for the product. 
Hunt et al (2010)50, show that alcohol excise taxes have been used around 
the world to discourage consumption, to shift consumption to alcohol products 
with lower alcohol by volume, and to raise government revenue. Excise duties 
on alcohol are contentious, as it is a regressive tax that is charged regardless 
of one’s ability to pay. The study conducted by Hunt et al concludes that ‘the 
balance of evidence on the effects of alcohol prices and of taxation clearly 
indicates that increases in taxation and prices are associated with decreases 
in alcohol consumption and harms’. They point out also that the research 
shows that the real price of alcohol must rise to achieve those objectives. In 
other words the increase in taxation must be greater than the overall increase 
in consumer prices in order to achieve the desire outcome. Their research 
also shows that because the amount of tax paid is directly related to the 
amount of alcohol consumed, increases in excise duties on alcohol will be 
paid disproportionately by those who consumer most alcohol. The overall 
impact of taxation however varies from country to country, depending on 
social, economic and cultural conditions in the country, but in overall terms, 
taxation is an effective instrument for influencing the level of alcohol that is 
consumed.  
Research also shows that increasing taxes alone may not achieve the desired 
outcome, because the incidence of the tax may fall on the manufacturer or the 
retailer, rather than the consumer. There is limited international research 
available on the extent to which tax increases influence the consumer price of 
alcohol, but they stress that an understanding of the pass-through rate from 
tax increases to prices is a key pre-condition to shedding light on how tax 
changes would affect consumers, producers, retailers and society as a whole. 
It is clear from the experience in Ireland that in the case of retail multiples in 
particular, tax increases are often absorbed at least in part by the retailer and 
not passed on to the consumer, thereby negating the health impact. 
It has been suggested that excise and/or other taxation measures could be 
‘tailored’ to address specific problems. The one area that seems to have been 
tried with Alcopops. These drinks, attractive to younger drinkers, have been 
targeted by policymakers in several countries. More generally, there are 
plenty of advocates who suggest that simply raising taxes is a blunt 
instrument that targets problem and non-problem drinkers alike. Hence, they 
argue, policies should be pointed at the specific target of problem drinkers. 
Apart from Alcopops, we have found no other significant policy measures 
have been adopted in this way. 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF VARIOUS POLICY MEASURES 
FOR IRELAND 
 
CJP Economic Consultants conducted an extensive literature review on the 
various policy options available and those that have been used in selected 
jurisdictions. As we have mentioned, the bulk of the international research has 
tended to focus on how best to reduce the consumption of alcohol, but a lot 
less research has been conducted on the impact the various policies have 
had on the overall economy; tax revenues; employment levels; the alcohol 
industry; cross-border trade and illegal activities. This lack of real research is 
probably related to the fact that much of the research has been conducted by 
health lobbyists rather than economists. Clearly however, these are factors 
that must be taken in to account in any policy formulation regarding the 
consumption of alcohol. 
The literature review shows that in Canada there is an acceptance that public 
policies that raise the price of alcohol are an effective means of reducing 
alcohol consumption. A decade ago Saskatchewan set minimum prices for 
alcohol content and following the extensions and price rises in April 2010, 
total annual per capita consumption fell by 3.5 %, but the value of the alcohol 
sold increased by 4.3 % per capita. The broader economic consequences are 
thus likely to have been relatively minimal. 
The OECD40 estimates that adults over the age of 15 in Ireland consumed 
11.9 litres of alcohol per capita in 2010, which is the 7th highest in the EU-27 
and is almost twice as much as the lowest consuming country, Italy. Between 
1980 and 2010, consumption per capita in Ireland grew by 24 per cent, 
compared to an average decline of 15 per cent in the EU-27.  A target of 
reducing this to the OECD average of 9.1 litres by 2020 would represent a 
very significant step in the right direction from a health perspective. 
As highlighted in the international literature review, the effectiveness of pricing 
and taxation initiatives is almost certainly best maximized as part of a broader 
strategy. Such a broader strategy is outlined in the Steering Group Report on 
a National Substance Misuse Strategy (2012).  
Minimum Unit Pricing is almost universally recommended by researchers in 
the field, but it is not without risks. Hence, such a policy would need to be 
supported by other policies to make it effective in achieving its objectives. 
The authors of this report were asked to consider four alternative policy 
options - minimum unit pricing (MUP); the reintroduction of a ban on below 
cost selling; making the sales price of alcohol cover at least VAT plus excise; 
and Excise/Fiscal Measures. 
The objective of the four proposed measures is to increase the price of 
alcohol and reduce the level of alcohol that is consumed. It would be very 
difficult to achieve this in a revenue neutral manner, but it seems certain that 
the savings made in reducing the negative externalities from excessive 
alcohol consumption would eventually far outweigh any revenue loss to the 
Exchequer from reduced consumption.  
Furthermore, if structured properly the revenue losses could be minimized, as 
could the negative impact on employment in the alcohol industry and general 
economic activity. 
A MUP regime should be structured to make high alcohol products more 
expensive and lower alcohol products relatively less expensive. A price, below 
which alcohol could not be sold, based on covering higher Excise and VAT 
would have a disproportionate impact on the off-trade, which is where the real 
problems are caused, and put the on-trade back in a relatively advantageous 
position. 
The pub as an Irish institution has many advantages compared to the current 
trend of buying cheap alcohol in supermarkets and off licenses. The pub is a 
more controlled and regulated environment; it has strong social aspects; and 
is much more labour intensive than the off-trade. Policy should be designed to 
eliminate cheap below-cost sales of alcohol and loss-leader behavior by 
supermarkets. 
Job losses would be minimized through such a balanced policy. The 
argument that jobs would be lost on the manufacturing side from reduced 
domestic consumption does not stand up to scrutiny. The growing craft beer 
industry offers an expensive product in any event and so its growth would not 
be affected. Furthermore, export markets are becoming an increasingly 
important part of domestic drink manufacturing. 
Figure 8 shows the recent trend in exports of beverages and the general 
expectation is that this trend will continue. A DIGI report53 in 2012 suggested 
that the outlook for alcohol exports is very encouraging. The report showed 
that Ireland’s share of global exports of alcohol is 2.4 %, compared to 0.8 % 
global market share for all exports. 
The importance of exports in an Irish context should be clear, particularly the 
export market for premium products. It should also be clear that domestic 
price and tax reform does not represent a threat to jobs or output of the 
exporting sector. 
 
 
  
Figure 8: Beverage Exports 
Source: CSO 
A policy of MUP would have a minimal impact on premium products. Rather it 
would primarily target those alcoholic beverages that are cheap relative to 
their alcoholic content. 
While the evidence base for the economic consequences of alcohol tax 
reform is not extensive, what here is suggests that the consequences should 
be small in the short term and, provided the reforms are large enough, the 
positive societal effects will swamp any (probably small) jobs or other losses. 
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